I think we can think of Malcolm’s position here in two broad steps:

(A) The Error-Theory step:
(i) Moral propositions have no truth-value; they are neither true nor false. Our conception otherwise is due to a systematic error of assimilating the “logical form” of moral propositions to other types of propositions.
(ii) Attitudes toward moral propositions, therefore, are not really “propositional attitudes”, such as belief, etc. While we can formulate a sentences such as “John believes that murder is wrong” and this sentence looks like a typical propositional attitude sentence, this is merely a superficial syntactic similarity. Since moral propositions have no truth-value, sentences such as the example I just gave cannot be viewed as attitudes towards propositions.
(iii) Since moral propositions have no truth-values, disagreements about moral judgments cannot be construed as disagreement about the truth or falsity of a moral proposition. Some other account must be given to them.

(B) Since the error-theory about moral propositions is correct, then their deep-structure cannot be analyzed along the usual lines. So the error-theory allows us to re-construct the nature of moral propositions, attitudes toward moral matters, and apparent moral disagreement in new and different terms. Malcolm’s, Dennett’s, etc., are one approach one can take.

My question to this way of looking at things is this: What constraints must an account along the lines of (B) satisfy in order to be a satisfactory account of morality?

Our normal moral intuitions are guided by the underlying presupposition that moral propositions are either true or false; that our attitudes toward moral propositions is something like belief; that there are genuine moral disagreements; and that there are at least certain moral intuitions that can serve as evidence against one or another moral theory. Now in the absence of all of this pre-theoretical data, how can we determine whether one or another re-construction of the moral realm is better than another? We simply lack any basis to determine the adequacy of such theories. And that was the problem I have tried to pose to Malcolm previously.

peter

I’m sorry to have been unable to keep up here the past few days. I’m still a little woozy, but I’d like to move past the current obstacles to forward motion in this discussion.

Bob, when I talk about “ontological truth” in this context, I am only trying to make a distinction between what we believe to be obvious moral truths and some actual underlying “fact of the matter”. But yes, there is really no difference between what I am referring to as “ontological” truth and “plain vanilla” truth.

This business of “cognitive content” has certainly bogged things down here. I will read the SEP article you pointed me to. Once again, here is the position I am outlining:

When we utter sentences about morality, for example “murder is morally wrong”, we express beliefs that we hold, namely that it is in some way “true” that murder is wrong. I think that on a naturalistic view of human origins there we are constituted to have such beliefs because they have helped us to thrive, but I think there are no externally existing moral facts upon which such beliefs actually rest. There are indeed other sorts of facts than might account for our coming to hold these beliefs — organisms that are capable of empathetic, “Golden Rule” type relationshsips with each other will do better than those that aren’t, and so such intuitions will always arise in intelligent social animals — but I do not think that we need to conclude that there is some Platonic realm in which these alleged “truths” are carved.

In other words, if I say that it is a moral truth that x, and you say that it is a moral truth that ~x there is no deeper ontological fact to which we can appeal.

This does not mean that there is no “subject matter” regarding morality. Morality is obviously a central feature of cognitive and cultural architecture. All I am saying is that our belief that there are objective moral truths does not make it so: we may believe that there are such “facts of the matter”, but simply be mistaken.

It strikes me as (very) odd that anyone would suggest that whether human morality is even a subject at all should depend on possibly unanswerable questions of ontology and metaphysics.

Truth

Truth (Anglo-Saxon tréow, tryw, truth, preservation of a compact, from a Teutonic base Trau, to believe) is a relation which holds

(1) between the knower and the known — Logical Truth;

(2) between the knower and the outward expression which he gives to his knowledge — Moral Truth; and

(3) between the thing itself, as it exists, and the idea of it, as conceived by God — Ontological Truth. In each case this relation is, according to the Scholastic theory, one of correspondence, conformity, or agreement (adoequatio) (St. Thomas, Summa I:21:2).

I must say, the definition of moral truth given above confuses me.

In your 11:00 am post, you offer a quote from Peter in which he refers to an attitude of the sort usually called propositional attitudes (because they are conceived of as attitudes toward propositions). But your comment concerns the proposition, not the attitude. So it doesn’t engage the point Peter was making. When trying to sort out the issues before us, it’s necessary to move very carefully from one idea to the next or we’ll create a worse mess than the one we’re trying to clean up.

Generally any attitude accompanied by a “that” followed by a meaningful sentence expressing a proposition (or a full thought) is an attitude that has “cognitive content”.

So, “it is the case that torturing babies is wrong” fits this description; I argue that it may not have an ontological truth value, though. I hardly think this means that morality is not a subject at all.

If statements like “x is wrong” do assume that there is some fact of the matter, then they express cognitive content, regardless of whether that assumption is correct. Of course that assumption might be wrong. But I fail to see how that’s relevant to the queston of whether statements with moral content take truth values, or whether truth valuation is a binary or n-ary affair.

In ordinary language, we do, quite obviously, express opinions about morals; we say “x is wrong”, “y is right”, and so forth. My point is that such assertions assume that there is some ontological fact of the matter — and that this assumption may in fact be mistaken. I don’t know how much more simply I can put it than that.

This is really just a starting point, but we don’t seem able to get past it. What I want is to explore the consequences of this view to see what our moral framework can consist of if the model I am describing is correct.

Thanks for that resource. I’ve taken a quick look at it, and it looks to be very informative indeed.

I think I’m getting the idea behind “cognitive content,” but I’m not completely sure if I have it right. Would I be near the mark if I said that cognitive content refers to something that can be true or false in general, not just for specific individuals? That is, the statement “chocolate ice cream tastes good” may be true for me, but it may not be true for someone else. On the other hand, the statement “chocolate is made from small, furry bunnies” has cognitive content, because it can be true or false.

Hmm… I get the feeling that I am oversimplifying things here.

Also, couldn’t one get rather tangled up in the question of whether some statement is a true proposition (has truth value) or a mere opinion? E.g., “You think that is a proposition, but that’s merely your opinion; in fact, it’s merely an opinion.” “No, no. Your claim that tat is only an opinion and not a proposition is merely an opinion; it is in fact a proposition.”

Hm-m . . . That’s beginning to have a familiar ring to it. . . :-)

If we bring the person who holds an opinion into the picture things change. Even though it’s neither true nor false that butter brickle is better than chocolate, the statement “Smith judges butter brickle to be better than chocolate” is true or false — it’s a statement about Smith.

Hope that answers at least some of your questions.

Malcolm – A day later, how are you?

As to “cognitive content”–a question, addressed to all and sundry. If the statement “chocolate ice cream is good” is not taken to have cognitive content because it’s mere opinion and hence lacks truth value, what about the statement “I like chocolate ice cream”, when made by a specific person such as myself? I would assume it does have cognitive content–perhaps not verifiable or falsifiable by y’all, but nonetheless there. Have I got it right?

Charles–I empathize. “I believe that I know some things, and I know that I believe some things, but what the difference is between knowledge and belief I do not know.” Li’l thing I coined while in grad school, and it still applies.

‘nother question, that circles around to where the discussion started: What would the relationship be between “cognitive content” and “meaning”?

I hope you are well and nothing serious is going on.

Gentlemen!

I am leaving tomorrow morning to MN to visit my gf who underwent a serious brain operation yesterday. I will be away for about two weeks, so I will not be able to continue these discussions on a regular basis. Will try my best, but I cannot promise anything. It is unfortunate that when Malcolm wrote a reply post to my criticisms of his position, I must be absent.

Charles,

There is no need to feel stupid just because you may lack suitable background in certain areas in philosophy. Being exposed to such background may easily allow you to grasp most of what is being said here.

Now, as for “cognitive content”; perhaps, I should have defined this concept before I used it. Bob gave some good examples of what is and what is not included under the term ‘cognitive content’. The best place to research these technical terms is Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [linked on our sidebar -MP]. The articles there are excellent and range from fairly introductory to advanced and everything in between. It is the best “quick” source for these technical terms on line.

e.g., the preference in taste for chocolate ice-cream is said not to have a “cognitive content”. But the belief that the earth is flat has cognitive content; namely, the proposition expressed by the English sentence “The earth is flat”. Generally any attitude accompanied by a “that” followed by a meaningful sentence expressing a proposition (or a full thought) is an attitude that has “cognitive content”.
I hope this is somewhat helpful: Remember the Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Malcolm,

Let us know that you are OK as soon as you can.
peter

The truth status of statements about imaginary things has been approached in different ways by different people. You might recall some discussions of the semantics of imaginary entities at Bill V’s. It’s not a settled area by any means.