Motus Mentis

In a recent STRATFOR article, George Friedman uses the example of the “Arab Spring” uprising in Egypt as a case study in what he calls “an inherent contradiction in Western ideology and, ultimately, of an attempt to create a coherent foreign policy.”

At the root of this ideological confusion, says Friedman, is a tension between two central tenets of Western political philosophy:

Western countries, following the principles of the French Revolution, have two core beliefs. The first is the concept of national self-determination, the idea that all nations (and what the term “nation’ means is complex in itself) have the right to determine for themselves the type of government they wish. The second is the idea of human rights, which are defined in several documents but are all built around the basic values of individual rights, particularly the right not only to participate in politics but also to be free in your private life from government intrusion.

The first principle leads to the idea of the democratic foundations of the state. The second leads to the idea that the state must be limited in its power in certain ways and the individual must be free to pursue his own life in his own way within a framework of law limited by the principles of liberal democracy. The core assumption within this is that a democratic polity will yield a liberal constitution. This assumes that the majority of the citizens, left to their own devices, will favor the Enlightenment’s definition of human rights. This assumption is simple, but its application is tremendously complex. In the end, the premise of the Western project is that national self-determination, expressed through free elections, will create and sustain constitutional democracies.

I’m a recovered neoconservative, and as such I used to share this opinion myself. Many still do:

It is interesting to note that human rights activists and neoconservatives, who on the surface are ideologically opposed, actually share this core belief. Both believe that democracy and human rights flow from the same source and that creating democratic regimes will create human rights. The neoconservatives believe outside military intervention might be an efficient agent for this. Human rights groups oppose this, preferring to organize and underwrite democratic movements and use measures such as sanctions and courts to compel oppressive regimes to cede power. But they share common ground on this point as well. Both groups believe that outside intervention is needed to facilitate the emergence of an oppressed public naturally inclined toward democracy and human rights.

The problem with all of this is a curious modern blindness to vital historical and cultural realities, brought on by Western vanity about the universal appeal of its values:

The idea that the destruction of repressive regimes opens the door for democratic elections that will not result in another repressive regime, at least by Western standards, assumes that all societies find Western values admirable and want to emulate them. This is sometimes the case, but the general assertion is a form of narcissism in the West that assumes that all reasonable people, freed from oppression, would wish to emulate us.

Our choices, then, are not so simple as we would like to think they are:

Assume there is a choice between a repressive, undemocratic regime that is in the interests of a Western country and a regime that is democratic but repressive by Western standards and hostile to those interests. Which is preferable, and what steps should be taken?

These are blindingly complex questions that some observers ”” the realists as opposed to the idealists ”” say not only are unanswerable but also undermine the ability to pursue national interests without in any way improving the moral character of the world. In other words, you are choosing between two types of repression from a Western point of view and there is no preference. Therefore, a country like the United States should ignore the moral question altogether and focus on a simpler question, and one that’s answerable: the national interest.

The question then is: if the simplistic moral calculus applied earlier this year by giddy “Arab Spring” cheerleaders who saw little more in Tahrir Square than Westernizing hipsters with iPhones was based on a narcissistic delusion, then what is our real national interest in the region? If the creation of secular pro-Western Jeffersonian democracies in the Muslim lands of the Middle East and Maghreb is just a pipe dream — and it is — then we should evaluate our aims more coolly and clearly. I can think of a few (your mileage may vary):

1) Tamping down Islamism where we can, or at least ensuring that Islamist regimes understand that we will entertain no more costly fantasies about “nation-building” in response to the next hostile act on the part of their jihadis against us; that the next time around there will instead be a good deal of nation-demolition on offer, and very little indeed in the way of building.

2) Maintaining the economically vital flow of oil and shipping through Mideast waters.

3) Standing in solidarity with Israel: our only genuine ally, the only West-friendly democracy, and indeed the only non-barbarous nation in the region.

You can read all of Mr. Friedman’s excellent essay here.