Here’s the latest assessment on the situation in Ukraine, from ~finnem capital:
Our latest analysis on the “counteroffensive”:
Despite claims that the counteroffensive “has not begun,” in fact, after the Armed Forces of Ukraine were stalled by highly effective strikes on brigade level depots of fuel and munitions, not to mention troop concentrations behind the lines, in the late spring, it seems clear that major offensive efforts have been underway since early June.
Forced to play for time with reduced objectives after the backfield strikes threw logistics into chaos, the Ukrainians have finally launched into offensive operations with attempts at everything from a general screening attack (just short of a full-blown offensive), to fixing attacks, to probes, along the entire line of contact in an effort to create concentration movements by the Russians in particular areas (and therefore dilutions in other areas). The June 4-12 operations are representative of the results of the best efforts Ukraine could mount earlier this month.
They did not go well:
The doomed assault by two or perhaps three of the five brigades under Ukraine’s 10th Operational Corps (Assault), specifically the 47th Separate Mechanised (Assault) Brigade (which sported Leopards given to Ukraine plus more than 50 M2 Bradley IFVs and troops trained at U.S. bases in Germany) and the Ukrainian 33rd Mechanised Brigade (which also fielded Leopards, including the much praised 2A6) and possibly the 21st Mechanised Brigade, is an important datapoint.
The 10th Operational Corps was specifically stood up as an overall structure for assault formations, that is, to field offensive combat power. Aside from the 47th and the 33rd, it contains the 37th Marine Brigade, a light mechanised force intended to be highly mobile to conduct reconnaissance and probing operations and equipped with British Mastiff MRAPs and AMX-10RCs, the French reconnaissance vehicles the Western press amusingly took to labelling “wheeled tanks”.
The 10th also contains the 82nd Air Assault Brigade which was created from the remains of the 25th Airborne Brigade and the 80th Air Assault Brigade, and, since Russian air superiority in theatre means Ukraine cannot deploy rotor craft to execute the unit’s Air Assault function, the 82nd was given the famous Challenger 2 tanks provided by the UK (who gives 75 ton Main Battle Tanks to an Air Assault unit?), and Stryker infantry fighting vehicles lend-leased by the U.S., and German Marder infantry fighting vehicles.
The 10th also contains the 21st Mechanised Brigade, which appears to be stocked with Leopard tanks as well, but about which little other information is available.
In total, Ukraine is thought to have created eight new assault brigades for the counteroffensive. That three of these (more than a third of the total mechanised assault groupings) were committed to a disastrous assault early this month (depicted in the infamous and disheartening minefield video) [Not going to link that here – MP] would seem to expose as fiction any claims that operations earlier this month were merely “battlefield prep.”
Instead, the goal of such a serious screening attack would be to allow the restructured and reformed forces (logistics work that has been mostly completed as of this writing) to poke a hole somewhere and identify an axis where the rest of the “best” Ukrainian units (NATO trained and equipped) could push with a 7-9 brigade force of secondary units (i.e. 20,000 – 30,000 troops at the new reduced standard of 2,000 men per Ukrainian brigade) that waits in reserve.
The issue now that those efforts have been rebuffed is that most of these reserve units are not assault units, and the highest grade assault units under the 10th Operational Corps have been badly mauled. We see signs of confirmation here where recent prisoners taken by the Russians have disclosed that they were in traditionally defensive units but nevertheless pressed into assault roles, roles for which they have received no training.
The fact that hundreds if not thousands of personnel, including large populations of NATO / foreign mercenary forces, are lingering around in places like Kramatorsk, less than 30 kilometres behind the front, demonstrates the issue. The Russian strike there purportedly was targeting a brigade level command post, in particular the leadership element of the 56th Motorised Brigade, a non-assault formation which has been augmented with a hefty fleet of T-72 Main Battle Tanks including T-72M1 and T-72M1R tanks from Poland for the counteroffensive. The 56th is the sort of unit that would be expected to exploit any breakthrough of Russian lines, so its presence at Kramatorsk is understandable. In fact, several prisoners from the 56th have also been captured in the Kherson region in the last few weeks. Lacking proper assault formations that are combat-ready, the Ukrainian ground forces are faced with a number of difficulties.
Since Ukrainian efforts to prompt dilutive manoeuvres by the Russian forces have failed to meet any of their objectives, and every day that passes sees Ukraine’s shiny new assault capability either mauled in the field well in front of Russian defensive lines, or degraded by Russian strikes, there would seem to be only one option remaining for Ukraine if it wishes to continue offensive operations: it must pick an axis and mount an all-out assault with the support of whatever aviation and GBAD assets are still in a condition to conduct combat operations. This will necessarily cause Ukraine to initiate precisely what it was attempting to inflict on Russian operations: concentrative manoeuvres to create a Centre of Gravity for an assault, manoeuvres that necessarily result in dilutive effects elsewhere, effects that the Russians, with strong aerial and space-based reconnoissance assets, will see immediately. Effects that will also thin out already scarce anti-air resources and permit Russian deep-strikes to do even more damage.
The two open questions that remain for us:
1. Will Ukraine launch “the final battle” or will they return to a defensive operational posture and try to deter a major Russian operation on the ground, but face the constant attrition cost of Russia’s deep-strike capabilities?
2. As things look increasingly grim for Ukraine’s military aspirations in the theatre, will NATO step up intervention in the only way it is now possible to do so: NATO troops commanded by NATO leadership on the ground in Ukraine?
Our friend ~finnem offers detailed analysis that you won’t find elsewhere. Stay tuned for further updates.