Baby Elephants!

Courtesy of Jonah Goldberg.

Wilders Acquitted!

Good news. One cheer for Europe.

Here.

Two From The Right

Lawrence Auster has put up two links today that I think deserve reposting here.

In the first, Mark Steyn addresses our nation’s modern, self-abnegating approach to war:

Transnational do-gooding is political correctness on tour. It takes the relativist assumptions of the multiculti varsity and applies them geopolitically: The white man’s burden meets liberal guilt. No wealthy developed nation should have a national interest, because a national interest is a selfish interest. Afghanistan started out selfishly ”” a daringly original military campaign, brilliantly executed, to remove your enemies from power and kill as many of the bad guys as possible. Then America sobered up and gradually brought a freakish exception into compliance with the rule. In Libya as in Kosovo, war is legitimate only if you have no conceivable national interest in whatever conflict you’re fighting. The fact that you have no stake in it justifies your getting into it. The principal rationale is that there’s no rationale, and who could object to that? Applied globally, political correctness obliges us to forswear sovereignty.

In the second, Walter Williams reminds us that racism is alive and well in America.

Knights And Pawns

As a follow-on to our breezy review of the Foreign Relations Committee’s report, here’s a serious assessment of what the endgame in Afghanistan might look like, from STRATFOR’s George Friedman.

The gist:

The United States was always aware of the limits of Pakistani assistance. The United States accepted this publicly because it made Pakistan appear to be an ally at a time when the United States was under attack for unilateralism. It accepted it privately as well because it did not want to see Pakistan destabilize. The Pakistanis were aware of the limits of American tolerance, so a game was played out.

That game is now breaking down, not because the United States raided Pakistan and killed bin Laden but because it is becoming apparent to Pakistan that the United States will, sooner or later, be dramatically drawing down its forces in Afghanistan. This drawdown creates three facts. First, Pakistan will be facing the future on its western border with Afghanistan without an American force to support it. Pakistan does not want to alienate the Taliban, and not just for ideological reasons. It also expects the Taliban to govern Afghanistan in due course. India aside, Pakistan needs to maintain its ties to the Taliban in order to maintain its influence in Afghanistan and guard its western flank. Being cooperative with the United States is less important. Second, Pakistan is aware that as the United States draws down, it will need Pakistan to cover its withdrawal strategically. Afghanistan is not Iraq, and as the U.S. force draws down, it will be in greater danger. The U.S. needs Pakistani influence. Finally, there will be a negotiation with the Taliban, and elements of Pakistan, particularly the ISI, will be the intermediary.

The Pakistanis are preparing for the American drawdown. Publicly, it is important for them to appear as independent and even hostile to the Americans as possible in order to maintain their domestic credibility. Up to now, they have appeared to various factions in Pakistan as American lackeys. If the United States is leaving, the Pakistanis can’t afford to appear that way anymore. There are genuine issues separating the two countries, but in the end, the show is as important as the issues. U.S. accusations that the government has not cooperated with the United States in fighting Islamists are exactly what the Pakistani establishment needs in order to move to the next phase. Publicly arresting CIA sources who aided the United States in capturing bin Laden also enhances this new image.

From the American point of view, the war in Afghanistan ”” and elsewhere ”” has not been a failure. There have been no more attacks on the United States on the order of 9/11, and that has not been for al Qaeda’s lack of trying. U.S. intelligence and security services, fumbling in the early days, achieved a remarkable success, and that was aided by the massive disruption of al Qaeda by U.S. military operations. The measure of military success is simple. If the enemy was unable to strike, the military effort was a success. Obviously, there is no guarantee that al Qaeda will not regenerate or that another group will not emerge, but a continued presence in Afghanistan at this point doesn’t affect that. This is particularly true as franchise operations like the Yemen-based al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula begin to overtake the old apex leadership in terms of both operational innovation in transnational efforts and the ideological underpinnings of those attacks.

In the end, the United States will leave Afghanistan (with the possible exception of some residual special operations forces). Pakistan will draw Afghanistan back into its sphere of influence. Pakistan will need American support against India (since China does not have the force needed to support Pakistan over the Himalayas nor the navy to protect Pakistan’s coast). The United States will need Pakistan to do the basic work of preventing an intercontinental al Qaeda from forming again. Reflecting on the past 10 years, Pakistan will see that as being in its national interest. The United States will use Pakistan to balance India while retaining close ties to India.

A play will be acted out like the New Zealand Haka, with both sides making terrible sounds and frightening gestures at each other. But now that the counterinsurgency concept is being discarded, from all indications, and a fresh military analysis is under way, the script is being rewritten and we can begin to see the end shaping up. The United States is furious at Pakistan for its willingness to protect American enemies. Pakistan is furious at the United States for conducting attacks on its sovereign territory. In the end it doesn’t matter. They need each other. In the affairs of nations, like and dislike are not meaningful categories, and bullying and treachery are not blocks to cooperation. The two countries need each other more than they need to punish each other. Great friendships among nations are built on less.

The Enfeebled Host

Here’s a sad item about central California — a lament, perhaps, or something approaching the final draft of an obituary — from Victor Davis Hanson.

Tar Baby

Recently the Senate Foreign Relations Committee produced a report on how things are going in Afghanistan, and I’ve given it a careful going-over. Despite my natural optimism, I’ll confess it’s left me a little chopfallen.

I’ve excerpted a few snippets below:

Foreign aid, when misspent, can fuel corruption, distort labor and goods markets, undermine the host government’s ability to exert control over resources, and contribute to insecurity. According to the World Bank, an estimated 97 percent of Afghanistan’s gross domestic product (GDP) is derived from spending related to the international military and donor community presence.

Real progress, if you ask me. Why, I think it was as high as 98 percent just a few years back.

The administration is understandably anxious for immediate results to demonstrate to Afghans and Americans alike that we are making progress.

Worth repeating, that one: the United States of America is “understandably anxious” to demonstrate to the Afghans that they’re getting our money’s worth.

However, insecurity, abject poverty, weak indigenous capacity, and widespread corruption create challenges for spending money.

Well, spending the taxpayer’s money is always a hard job, even under the best of circumstances. And the problem here is that we have to spend so much of it.

High staff turnover, pressure from the military, imbalances between military and civilian resources, unpredictable funding levels from Congress, and changing political timelines have further complicated efforts. Pressure to achieve rapid results puts our civilians under enormous strain to spend money quickly.

Right: we need to get rid of the stuff as fast as we can.

We need to take a closer look at how we are spending money in Afghanistan and the impact it is having on the Afghan state.

Oh, I don’t know. Is that really necessary?

The U.S. Government relies heavily on contractors in Afghanistan, but multiple reports and the recent crisis at Kabul Bank have raised alarms about the lack of robust oversight.

Bit of a shock, that.

Most U.S. aid bypasses the Afghan Government in favor of international firms. This practice can weaken the ability of the Afghan state to execute its budget, lead to redundant and unsustainable donor projects, and fuel corruption. The United States has committed to funding more aid directly through the Afghan Government, but stronger measures must first be taken to ensure greater accountability of our funds. The U.S. strategy is focused on building the capacity of Afghan institutions to deliver basic services. The State Department and USAID are currently spending approximately $1.25 billion on such efforts. But our overreliance on international technical advisors to build Afghan capacity may undermine these efforts. Our aid projects need to focus more on sustainability so that Afghans can absorb our programs when donor funds recede.

Yes, well, that should be easy enough if we really put our minds to it; we just need to get that remaining sliver of GDP — what was it again, 97%? — sorted out.

The goal of our assistance in Afghanistanis to create the conditions for a more stable, democratic government capable of resisting attempts by Al Qaeda and other insurgent groups from returning and establishing safe havens from which to launch attacks on the U.S. homeland.

…and teaching pigs to fly.

As we begin the transition process to Afghan-led security and as our civilians absorb more tasks from the military, our civilian assistance strategy must focus on what is necessary, achievable, and sustainable.

Which is to say, nothing.

While the U.S. Government will continue to support the government and people of Afghanistan with foreign assistance after our troops come home, in the words of USAID Administrator Shah, we must provide assistance ”˜”˜in a way that allows our efforts to be replaced over time by efficient local governments, thriving civil societies and vibrant private sectors.’’

Got it: “efficient local governments, thriving civil societies and vibrant [vibrant!!] private sectors.” Check.

This next is my favorite part, I think:

Today, the focus of U.S. assistance in Afghanistan is to build the capacity of Afghan institutions and promote economic development in order to create jobs and weaken popular support for the insurgency. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has argued that this approach is ”˜”˜far from an exercise in nation-building’’ because it aims ”˜”˜to achieve realistic progress in critical areas’’ and is aligned with our security objectives.

Let’s see: creating “efficient local governments, thriving civil societies and vibrant private sectors.” Building the capacity of Afghan institutions, promoting economic development, and creating jobs. Yep, that sounds pretty far from “nation-building”, all right. And “realistic”, too! (After all, promoting economic development and creating jobs is exactly what this administration specializes in.)

And the logic’s iron-clad: this can’t possibly be “an exercise in nation-building”, because it’s “aligned with our security objectives.”

Well, great so far. But how are we getting it all done?

To accomplish this mission, the State Department and USAID dramatically increased the number of civilians on the ground in Afghanistan from 531 civilians in January 2009 to about 1,300 today,with approximately 920 in Kabul and 380 in the field. The number of civilians is expected to peak at roughly 1,450 by mid-2014, according to Embassy officials. But overall funding levels peaked in 2010. This means that the Embassy will have more civilians in the field with fewer resources in 2014, just as the security transition is in full swing. Safely maintaining civilians in Afghanistan is costly. According to senior Embassy officials, each U.S. civilian costs about half a million dollars.

Wow, that’s pretty expensive! But given that it includes all the security costs, etc., it’s not really so bad, I guess.

Oh, wait…

This figure covers training, salaries, and travel expenses but excludes security costs covered by the military, which civilians will have to absorb as we begin drawing down troops. It also excludes the cost of emergency protection details (EPD) that transport our civilians in theatre. An EPD for an Ambassador in Kabul, for instance, can cost approximately $8 million a year.

Oh.

Well, okay, okay: yes, we’re spending a lot of money over there, but we have every reason to believe it’s going to be well worth it in the long run:

Our stabilization strategy assumes that short-term aid promotes stability in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and ”˜”˜wins hearts and minds’’ by improving security, enhancing the legitimacy and reach of the central government, and drawing support away from the Taliban. It presumes that the international community and the Afghan Government have shared objectives when it comes to promoting longer term development, good governance, and the rule of law.

Right! There you are.

These assumptions may not be correct.

Oh.

In March 2010, a conference at Wilton Park in the United Kingdom brought together leading experts on the role of development in counterinsurgency. The conference report found ”˜”˜a surprisingly weak evidence base for the effectiveness of aid in promoting stabilization and security objectives’’ in Afghanistan.

Administrator Shah agrees that ”˜”˜we must strive to uncover the true drivers of instability in a region, based . . . on local perspectives. . . What we’ve found is that it is generally not the case that a lack of schools or roads drives conflict. Often the situation is far subtler, having to do with local power dynamics or long-held grudges.

Our aid strategy cannot assume that poverty or unemployment alone fuel the insurgency. For example, according to the World Bank, poverty rates in the insurgency-plagued Helmand and Kandahar provinces are less than 30 percent. By contrast, in the more peaceful central and northern provinces, poverty rates run from between 42 and 58 percent in Bamyan and Ghor to upward of 58 percent in Balk province. In a recent study of the drivers of political violence, USAID found limited evidence linking poverty and low education to support for radical groups.’’

Doh!!!

Security and governance matter. Development spending can strengthen the government and weaken insurgents in areas that are secure and enjoy good governance.

Well, no worries, then — because as we all know, most of Afghanistan is secure, and enjoys good governance.

It can also have the opposite effect when security and governance are poor or absent. As historian Mark Moyar observes:

. . . the United States spent more than $100 million repairing and upgrading the Kajaki hydropower plant to provide electricity to Helmand and Kandahar provinces, but last year half of its electricity went into areas where the insurgents control the electric grid, enabling the Taliban to issue electric bills to consumers and send out collection agents with medieval instruments of torture to ensure prompt payment. The consumers in these places use the power for the irrigation of fields that grow poppies, whichin turn fuel the opium trade from which the Taliban derive much of their funding.

Whoops!

Afghanistan is not Iraq, which had a functioning state and robust government and civil society institutions. After the fall of the Taliban, we were faced with the challenge of building a democratic style government and modern economy.

That’s all fine, just as long as we aren’t doing any of that “nation-building”.

The U.S. effort began in earnest in 2009, when the administration and Congress recognized the need for properly resourcing the civilian effort. Ongoing development aid will be needed for the foreseeable future to help Afghanistan become stable.

No problem there! We’re pretty flush these days.

Given the emphasis on annual budget cycles in Washington and the lack of a multiyear authorization for Afghanistan that could provide a roadmap for future funding, the administration is again under pressure to demonstrate quick results to Congress. Many in Congress are fixated on ”˜”˜burn rates,’’ or how fast the money is spent and how much money is left in the ”˜”˜pipeline.’’ This results in undue emphasis at USAID and the State Department on getting money out the door to ensure future appropriations at significant levels. Political pressures create perverse incentives to spend money even when the conditions are not right.

Boy, if only we didn’t have to worry about those darn “political pressures”, we could really do this thing up right. Makes you wish we were more like China!

But don’t despair: at least we’re getting something done with the money we do spend. We’ve got our top people on the job over there, after all…

In addition to the risk of contractor fraud, the use of large numbers of contractors raises other significant opportunities for waste and mismanagement. By contracting with U.S. and international contractors at western prices (the ”˜”˜primes’’), donor funds can be lost to corruption through multiple subcontractors over which the U.S. Government has little to no control (the ”˜”˜subs’’). Projects may be built at costs substantially less than the amount originally paid, using substandard materials and methods. Poor security conditions and a lack of contracting officers overseeing contactor performance could deter site visits to confirm whether the project was properly built, or even built at all. Afghanistan is littered with abandoned or half-built structures.

In 2010, massive fraud was uncovered at Kabul Bank, including loans totaling $900 million to shareholders at the Bank,which is nearly 5 percent of Afghanistan’s current Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Fraud of this scale resulted from failures at every level, including internal bank control; Kabul Bank’s auditors””A.F.Ferguson & Co., a Pakistani affiliate of Pricewaterhouse Coopers; Afghanistan’s Central Bank; the Central Bank’s advisors, Deloitte, under a USAID contract; the political establishment; and USAID. At the time, USAID had only one contracting officer’s technical representative overseeing the $92 million contract with Deloitte to provide technical assistance to the Central Bank. An investigation undertaken by the USAID Office of Inspector General determined that Deloitte knew or should have known that there were serious problems at Kabul Bank and failed to alert USAID officials in Kabul.

Fraud?? At the Kabul Bank???

Oy… So how do we pay out all this money, anyway? Straight to the government, or what?

ON-BUDGET VERSUS OFF-BUDGET FUNDING

Most international donors, including the United States, channel much of their aid ”˜”˜off-budget,’’ meaning it does not go through the Afghan Government. Off-budget funding is appealing because it provides more financial and programmatic control to the donor, which is important in an environment where there are significant concerns about weak government capacity and corruption.

Oh. Well, okay, if that’s what works best.

However, off-budget funding has significant downsides.

Uh-oh…

It can weaken the ability of the Afghan state to control resources, which results in donor duplication, and can fuel corruption. It has also led to the creation of thousands of donor-driven projects without any plan for sustaining them, including 16,000 CERP projects funded by the military at a cost of over $2 billion. As USAID notes, there is a daily tension between ”˜”˜building capacity in the Afghan Government, putting U.S. taxpayer money on-budget, and ensuring that urgent [Afghan] government functions happen.’’

Ultimately, the Afghan Government must be a genuine partner for our assistance efforts to succeed. It cannot be held accountable for processes over which it has little to no control. Thus, the U.S. Government is working to meet its Kabul Conference commitment to fund up to 50 percent of our aid ”˜”˜on-budget’’ by FY 2012 from approximately 21 percent in FY 2009, 35 percent in FY 2010, and 37”“45 percent in FY 2011.

Pay to the order of… is that K-A-R-Z-A-I?”

According to the London and Kabul conference communiques, delivering aid through the Afghan Government is ”˜”˜conditioned on the Government’s progress in further strengthening public financial management systems, reducing corruption, improving budget execution, developing a financial strategy and Government capacity towards the goal.’’ For instance, the Afghan Government committed at the Kabul Conference to pass an improved Audit Law as part of its effort to improve public financial management. This is also an Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) benchmark.

Good. Hold their feet to the fire. Keep ’em honest. Show ’em we mean business. Let’s have some US-style transparency and accountability!

Yet the U.S. Treasury Department and many at Embassy Kabul believe that the Audit Law passed by the government is insufficient and does not meet the Afghan obligation under the ARTF benchmark.

Hmpf. Well, so be it, then. We U.S. taxpayers won’t fork over a red cent till they straighten up and fly right!

Failure to meet the benchmark would mean that for the first time, a certain amount of funds””approximately $17 million””would not be disbursed to the Afghan Government, sending a signal that these commitments matter.

Exactly. A little tough love. That’ll get ’em in line.

However, the U.S. Government’s current position is to accept the deficient Audit Law, despite strong internal opposition, in order to avoid a confrontation with the Afghan Government.

Oh.

Well, yes, I suppose we can’t have that.

Anyway, you get the idea, readers. There’s lots more here.

In short, and all kidding aside: it’s time to go.

One From The Gipper

Here’s a pungent partisan punchline, from a president who could actually tell a joke.

Bottom Feeder

If you’re curious about the “go meatless” movement, then get a load of this.

Clarence Clemons, 1942-2011

We note with sorrow the death of Clarence Clemons, soul of the E Street Band for forty years, who died Saturday after suffering a devastating stroke. His death will leave an awfully big hole in a great many hearts.

I got to know Clarence more than thirty years ago, when the E Street Band moved into Power Stations Studios in the spring of 1979 to begin work on the album The River. (At the time I was about six months into my eight-year stint there, and was still working as an electronic-maintenance tech, waiting for an opening in the recording staff.) The band camped out at the studio for more than a year, spending long hours every weekday recording, in all, 50 songs or so; by the end it felt as if the studio staff and the band (Bruce, the six sidemen, and the roadies, Doug and Mike) had become a big extended family.

As I remember it, on a typical day the band would filter in sometime in the late afternoon, to be on hand if they were needed for a take. Meanwhile, Bruce would prowl the studio, guitar in hand, writing or fine-tuning the day’s song. Often there’d be nothing to record until late in the evening, which meant long, restless hours for the players. Clarence liked to come back and hang out with us techs back in the maintenance shop, where the radio was always on, and where he could enjoy little recreational indulgences away from the watchful eye of the Boss. We were rather protective of our little geek-sanctum back there, but Clarence was always welcome.

Everything about Clarence Clemons was big: his Brobdingagian frame, his great, booming laugh, his dinner-plate-sized hands, his trademark thundering sound, and above all his enormous love of life, and his warm, generous heart. Though I hadn’t seen him for many years, it grieves me — as it does millions of others, all round the world — to hear that he is gone.

const szJobSecurity = this;

My friend and colleague, the extravagantly gifted software engineer, globe-trotting bon vivant, and intrepid adventurer Yaniv Sarig, has sent me a outrageously funny item that will, I’m afraid, only evoke incapacitating hilarity in those of you who know a thing or two about programming.

But it’s too good not to share, so here it is. I hope some of you out there enjoy it.

Schlock And Awe

Yesterday the Times‘s Nicholas Kristof posted a risibly bird-brained column entitled Our Lefty Military. In it he lauds the U.S. armed forces as a socialist paradigm, comparing them in glowing terms to the morally inferior “gimme” mentality of the private sector.

We read:

The United States armed forces knit together whites, blacks, Asians and Hispanics from diverse backgrounds, invests in their education and training, provides them with excellent health care and child care. And it does all this with minimal income gaps: A senior general earns about 10 times what a private makes, while, by my calculation, C.E.O.’s at major companies earn about 300 times as much as those cleaning their offices. That’s right: the military ethos can sound pretty lefty.

…And while the ethic of business is often “Gimme,’ the military inculcates an ideal of public service that runs deep.

That’s all very nice, though I’ll confess I’ve never imagined “knitting” to be an important military function. (I guess that just shows I’m behind the times; at the very least, I’m obviously behind the Times.) On the other hand, the military also tells all its members, with the full force of law, when to eat and sleep, what they will do each and every day, what they can and cannot say, what they will wear, where they will live, and much much more. If the participants don’t like it, that’s too bad; they can’t leave until their term of service is over. Nicholas Kristof may wish that the whole nation were more like that, but I don’t.

Mr. Kristof quotes Wesley Clark, offering a dazzlingly moronic assessment:

“It’s the purest application of socialism there is,’ Wesley Clark, the retired four-star general and former supreme allied commander of NATO forces in Europe, told me. And he was only partly joking.

“Only partly”, indeed. What Mr. Kristof and General Clark overlook, in their wistful longings — and this is the equivalent of a botanist overlooking a mature sequoia in his driveway — is that the military is a fully taxpayer-funded agency of the U.S. government, created and maintained solely (ostensibly at least), for a specific, vitally important purpose. It is not, and cannot be, “socialist”, because socialism refers to a economic system of national government in which the State controls the means of production and the flow of capital (i.e., the source of the funding for agencies like the military, which produce nothing, create no wealth, and exist only as debits — really big ones — on the national balance sheet). Socialism has nothing whatsoever to do with how government agencies themselves are managed — and certainly not, for God’s sake, with Army pay-grade differentials. If we now have a “lefty” military that imagines its mission is to be a community-outreach/public-assistance program instead of a maximally effective strategic and tactical force, that is simply a symptom of political ideology gone off the rails at the highest levels of government, not any brief for the alleged blessings, or practical feasibility, of socialism.

That this sort of applesauce (I’m reminded also of Tom Friedman’s wishing, in his own columns, that we could be more like China) can be published, with a straight face, by our nation’s newspaper of record makes it awfully hard to keep one’s spirits up.

Read it all here.

A Pouch Full Of Stones

Here’s a salient item from John McCreary at NightWatch:

Israel: On 19 June the Defense Forces will begin a nationwide civil defense exercise, called Turning Point 5, that will include the largest simulation of missile interceptions ever held by the air force, The Jerusalem Post reported.

The exercise will involve all the air force’s missile defense systems — David’s Sling, Iron Dome and Arrow. Hundreds of “missiles” will be fired, in simulation, into Israel from Iran, Gaza, Syria and Lebanon.

The week-long drill will test the responses of the Home Front Command, the Israel Police, the Defense Ministry’s National Emergency Administration and other emergency services to a large scale missile attack. Eighty municipalities and local authorities will participate.

Comment: This will be a high cost war preparation precisely because it involves large distortions to normality by civil sectors of the economy. These are not opportunity costs.

In considering civil defense drills in Israel, there are only two scenarios: Israel attacks and prepares the home front for retaliation or Israel expects to be attacked. The confusion and disarray in Arab states tends to rule out the existence of any threat from Arab or Muslim states that would justify a civil defense exercise of this size and cost.

A national civil defense exercise in preparation for an Israeli attack is never held close to the time of an attack. This exercise does not mean that Israel has decided to attack anyone, such as Iran, but it means that it might and Israel has begun taking the appropriate long term, prudent preparations and precautions. High civilian costs of military-related activities are always a hallmark of real war preparations.

See also this.

If It Did It

When even Jim Cramer is somber about the market, things can’t be good. In a post published today, Mr. Cramer outlines what he thinks “Armageddon” would look like, should it come to pass:

Throw in the towel and buy lower and later if you think the worst is coming. Or stay the course. At this point, the choice is yours, and I don’t want to make it for you. I did it last time and didn’t get much credit for it, even though I was right, and even that is being disputed, although I don’t know how that can be. I tire of criticism, so let me lay it out. You decide whether you want the pain.

Here’s the worst-case scenario:

1. Greece defaults. Presumably that reveals all of the credit default weaknesses where banks and insurers, chiefly in Europe, go belly-up. So do Portugal and Ireland. Spain, too. We get a Latin American moment where huge amounts of debts are canceled and reissued in the form of bonds that nobody wants, but at least the hit is taken.

2. The hit wipes out a huge number of foreign banks which, we discover, had insured the government paper and the bank paper that went under. We have the equivalent of Lehman, Bear, AIG, Fannie, Freddie. Washington Mutual and Wachovia. Throw in a Citigroup(C_). These banks are closed or merged by the surviving countries’ financial institutions.

3. Huge layoffs occur, and Europe is thrown into a great recession. Companies with decent balance sheets that have decent yields become accidental high-yielders and become attractive, because companies have much better balance sheets than governments do.

4. The recession pulls down the U.S. because of the tie-ins and the collapse of at least two or three banks that have hidden exposure to Europe. We learn about it too late. These banks are merged with healthy banks that raised a lot of capital. But the stocks get hammered close to 2008-2009 lows.

5. Big layoffs happen here because of Europe. Our economy wasn’t growing anyway. We’re sinking under the weight of higher commodity prices and Washington dithering and a president who hasn’t succeeded in creating a lot of jobs.

6. Money goes, again, from risky stocks into higher-yielding companies that weren’t higher yielding that long ago. Safety stocks rally because commodities collapse and their margins widen. This move happens on the way down.

7. New leadership emerges that is basically of the Coca-Cola(KO)-Pepsi(PEP) variety, as all industrials are hammered back to accidental high-yield levels. These stocks, along with the knock-offs and the pharmas, don’t need growth. They are winners.

8. China stops tightening because commodities have collapsed and wage inflation ends. That stems the decline in the likes of Caterpillar(CAT) and United Technologies(UTX).

9. Many companies fall back to their cash levels. .The companies buy back their stock, but they were buying at the highs so it doesn’t matter.

10. People leave the market in droves and stocks go to P/Es of 10 or lower, but it turns out the earnings aren’t there, so the P/Es are actually about 14-15, which is historic norm territory.

11. We get close to a 63% pullback of the entire run of 6000 Dow run. Let’s say we touch 7500 on the Dow. There are bargains galore. No one wants them.

12. We bottom out at levels that aren’t as bad as 2009 but are really bad, and people have had it with the market. We bottom because sellers are exhausted and earnings turn out to be bad but not terrible.

You can read the rest here.

I’m reminded of the generic Jewish telegram:

START WORRYING. DETAILS TO FOLLOW.

Call Of The Wild

If you haven’t already seen photographs, here is what happened in Vancouver when the Canucks lost the Stanley cup to Boston last night (after taking the first two games of the series).

HT: Lawrence Auster.

The Meltdown Pot

Here are a trio of reviews of Byron Roth’s book The Perils of Diversity: by Fjordman, Steve Sailer, and Richard Lynn.

The Ikhwan Springs Forward

Here’s Stanley Kurtz, writing at the Corner:

Although it’s too soon to fully understand what they mean, there are important developments in Egypt today in the run-up to this fall’s election. First, a major coalition of parties has formed that includes not only the Muslim Brotherhood, but two key liberal parties, Wafd and Ghad. The coalition also includes a left leaning Nasserist (Arab nationalist) party, Karama, and the socialist Tagammu party. At the same time, a there is talk of yet another coalition of liberal and socialist parties forming to oppose the first coalition, given that it seems to be dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood.

What is going on here? We can only speculate at this point, but it looks as though the strength of the Muslim Brotherhood has allowed it to coopt the core of its opposition. This assures weak non-Islamist parties of some representation, while also providing the Brotherhood with protection against backlash from the military or the United States, should it dominate the coming election. Yet the new coalition likely puts the Brotherhood in position to control an only nominally diverse parliament.

Many of the most prominent leftist and Nasserist parties are already in the Brotherhood-dominated coalition. That would leave a second, more purely secular coalition weak. On the other hand, if non-Islamist Egyptians are alarmed by the Brotherhood’s rising power, they could turn a possible counter-coalition into a significant force.

For now, however, it seems as though the Muslim Brotherhood has moved to coopt its opposition, and therefore has an excellent chance of exercising de facto control over the new parliament, with appropriate cover. The one thing that brings together Egypt’s liberals, leftists, and Islamists is foreign policy. So expect a Brotherhood-dominated coalition to be less than entirely friendly to the United States and Israel.

One of the only positive developments here is that the start of actual party maneuvering may force the Western press to start talking openly about socialist and Arab-nationalist parties. The media’s current characterization of nearly all non-Islamist groups as “secular liberals’ is deeply misleading.

And here’s another perspicacious observer, writing as the Egyptian “revolution” unfolded, back on January 28th:

The implosion of the senescent Mubarak dictatorship will create a power vacuum in the region’s most populous (and overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim) nation. The US, seeing that Mubarak is no longer the “strong horse’, has now conspicuously withdrawn its support for him, and has made public statements asserting the “universal human rights’ of the protestors now rioting in the streets, and expressing its optimism about democracy in general ”” despite what democracy can be expected to lead to in situations like this.

Nature abhors a vacuum, and although the newspapers have so far reported that religious groups appear not to have played much part in the uprising, anyone who has paid any attention to Egypt’s modern history will know that the principal opponent of the secular Egyptian dictatorship is, and has always been, the Muslim Brotherhood ”” the patient, hydra-headed global Islamist organization (its front groups include Hamas in Gaza, and CAIR in the US) that has been awaiting its chance in Egypt for decades (and which of course has never forgotten the execution of its chief political theorist, Sayyid Qutb, by Nasser in 1966).

The Muslim Brotherhood (or “Ikhwan’) differs from militant Islamist factions like al-Qaeda not in its goals, which are more or less the same, but only in its strategy: it has no moral or philosophical aversion to violent jihad, but considers it unnecessarily provocative, and therefore counterproductive. As such, it can make an ostentatious public display of distancing itself from terrorism, and so it is embraced by gullible Westerners ”” for whom the only imaginable threat from Islam is terrorist violence ”” as a “moderate’ Muslim organization to be supported and embraced. This suits the Ikwhan, whose avowed strategy is to sabotage secular democratic societies from within, just fine.

… We should not be surprised to see ”” in fact we should be astonished not to see ”” the Ikwhan seizing the opportunity now taking shape in Cairo, for which it has worked and waited so long.

…“Democracy’ there may be, briefly, in the wake of Mubarak’s fall; but anything resembling a secular, West-friendly democracy will be short-lived indeed, if it comes to pass at all.

Facts Of The Matter

This entry is part 12 of 15 in the series Free Will

Sam Harris has been addressing the question of free will in a series of short posts (we’ve already commented on the first two, here and very briefly here).

Dr. Harris is forthrightly skeptical that free will, as popularly conceived, exists. He seemed concerned, in the first of his posts, to make some sort of case for moral responsibility nevertheless, but it was a pretty half-hearted effort, and he didn’t pull it off. In the second post he didn’t really even try. He has now published a third item in the series, and it says nothing whatsoever about morality, focusing instead on buttressing his argument that our subjective sense of uncaused agency is an illusion.

As I’ve said before, I agree (though I don’t think that it matters in any meaningful way, in part because I think our familiar notion of “free”, original agency is incoherent).

Dr. Harris reminds us that while we can do as we choose, the choosing itself is opaque to introspection. We enter a deliberative state, and our decision simply appears. He quotes Einstein:

Honestly, I cannot understand what people mean when they talk about the freedom of the human will. I have a feeling, for instance, that I will something or other; but what relation this has with freedom I cannot understand at all. I feel that I will to light my pipe and I do it; but how can I connect this up with the idea of freedom? What is behind the act of willing to light the pipe? Another act of willing? Schopenhauer once said: Der Mensch kann was er will; er kann aber nicht wollen was er will (Man can do what he will, but he cannot will what he wills).

All correct, I think. Where then, does that leave consciousness? Experimental observation has shown that decisions seem to become accessible to conscious awareness only some time after they are made; the simplest account, then, would seem to be that consciousness is quite unnecessary for deliberation and decision-making. (Indeed, were it not for the lethal objection raised by Titus Rivas, Daniel Dennett, and others, and discussed here, I’d say that pure epiphenomenalism — the idea that consciousness has no causal effect on anything at all, and is just a spectator along for the ride — is the simplest and best account of what’s going on.)

But why, then, does consciousness even matter? Harris wonders too. He talks about “the very reason why people believe in free will in the first place: the feeling of conscious agency”:

People feel that they are the authors of their thoughts and actions, and this is the only reason why there seems to be a problem of free will worth talking about.

Each of us has many organs in addition to a brain that make unconscious “decisions” — but these are not events for which anyone feels responsible. Are you producing red blood cells and digestive enzymes at this moment? Your body is, of course, but if it “decided” to do otherwise, you would be the victim of these changes, rather than their autonomous cause. To say that I am “responsible” for everything that goes on inside my skin because it’s all “me”, is to make a claim that bears no relationship to the feelings of agency and moral responsibility that make the idea of free will an enduring problem for philosophy.

Our subjective experience having led us to a chimerical notion of what it means to be “free”, we then imagine that a choice must be conscious to be “free”, and that the choices of which we are conscious are “free”. Wrong all round, it seems.

Why, then, bother about consciousness at all, if it isn’t the seat of free agency? The answer is that consciousness matters because it is all there is to our subjective existence — and because even if our preferences and deliberations only present themselves to conscious awareness after the fact, they can still lead us to practices, to studies, to efforts of the attention, that enhance and deepen our conscious experience and the subjective enjoyment of our lives. Consciousness is what brings us into existence as loci of subjective experience.

As Gurdjieff said:

Life is real only then: when “I am.”

The Secret

Yesterday, June 12th, the lovely Nina and I celebrated our 29th wedding anniversary.

Given that so many marriages fall apart these days, that’s a pretty good streak — and as the years lengthen, I’m asked from time to time just how we’ve managed it. I’ve given it a lot of thought.

There are of course all the obvious tips: don’t marry for the wrong reasons; be slow to anger and quick to forgive; stand up for the things that really matter to you and give way cheerfully on everything else; and so on. There are other things, too, that are less obvious, that you learn over time. And there’s luck involved as well, no question: people change as they grow older, and sometimes the two who stood at the altar deeply in love simply aren’t around any more, twenty years later. There’s lots and lots more — I could probably write a book about it.

But a couple of years ago something occurred to me that I think is a very important part of why Nina and I are still so happy together after all this time — and once it struck me, I began to think that it’s probably an essential component of any long and happy marriage. This is going to sound flippant, but it isn’t: I’m 100% serious about this one, and if you think about it, you’ll understand why it makes such a difference.

Here it is:

We’ve always agreed, I think entirely without exception, about whether so-and-so is an asshole.

Stop The Hate!

There are few surer ways to mark oneself as a moral leper these days than to be a “nativist”: to imagine that over time the particular inhabitants of a place form a naturally balanced community, with an organic harmony that the mass importation of aliens is likely to disrupt, often with catastrophic results. To harbor such thoughts in this brave new world is to be a xenophobe, a bigot, a hate-filled “right-wing extremist”. It is double-plus-ungood; it is crimethink.

In case you have any lingering doubts, have a look here.

Damned If You Don’t

Here’s an item I’m still trying to get my head round:

Hebrew University has just awarded a research prize to a graduate student’s essay in which she claims that Israeli soldiers are “racists for not raping Arab women.’

Have a look.

Paper Cuts

Here and here.

A Jewel Unearthed

Poking around the other day at a second-hand bookseller’s in the West Village, I came upon a curious little self-published volume in a stained leather binding, cracked and brittle with age. Opening it with the greatest care, I discovered it to be a book of verse, and after reading a few entries with growing excitement, I realized that I held in my hand the work of an undiscovered genius. The proprietor being distracted by a mousy coed haggling over a rare first edition by Valerie Solanas, I slapped down the sticker price and scuttled out the door.

When I got the book home, I looked for clues to the author’s name, but sadly the hand-stenciled title page had almost faded away; as far as I could make out it appeared to be something like “Maxwell Poldark”. A rudely sketched portrait on the frontispiece revealed a haunted-looking man in late middle age, with a broad forehead beneath a receding hairline, a square jaw framed by drooping jowls, a strangely flattened nose, and the sunken eyes of a bibulous insomniac. Alas, a lengthy Google search turned up nothing.

I have since made discreet inquiries amongst my international network of scholars, literary critics, collectors, and connoisseurs, and my initial impression — that this “Poldark” is a hitherto unknown bard of sublime gifts, and that the slim volume now in my possession is a major discovery of immense literary importance — has been amply confirmed. I shall not publish its contents in full before my negotiations with various libraries, academic institutions, and private collectors are complete, but it would be churlish of me not to offer at least a small sample to our loyal readers. Here, then, is an offering randomly selected — and indeed, I have reason to believe that the long-forgotten verse here presented may in fact have served as the model for one far better known, and of far humbler quality.

Drinks

I shall not see, I dare to think
A poem lovely as a drink.

A drink whose level settles south,
Whilst flowing t’ward my thirsty mouth;

A drink that looks at me all night,
And puts my troubled thoughts to flight;

A drink that may, in summer, be
A frosty beer, or G&T;

Upon whose bosom tinkles ice
And rests a lovely lemon slice.

Poems are made by Hallmark, Inc.
But I’ll just make myself a drink.

Ready, Aim, Sing

Here I am working late again — so for this evening, just a link. It’s a good one, though: a collection of vintage Tom Lehrer videos.

Here.

Tilting At Windmills

Ah, the Green Revolution. Noblest of causes, worth every imaginable sacrifice. Yet what a wellspring of virtuous, practical, and best of all, economy-boosting innovations saving the planet has turned out to be! The Chevy Volt. Cap’n’Trade. Biofuels. Chinese light-bulbs. Wind-turbines.

Regarding the latter, the Viscount Monckton of Brenchley comments here.

Everything A Man Can Lose

Here’s the great Luther Allison, performing Living in the House of the Blues just a few months before his untimely death in 1997.

What’s that? Did you say you want some more? Well OK, here’s some more.

The Weight

Things look gloomy for the US economy these days. Job numbers are way down. The markets are sagging.

A while back President Obama instructed American businesses to “step up” and resume hiring. That ought to have disposed of the problem at once, but for some reason compliance has been spotty. A report from the Small Business Administration, The Impact of Regulatory Costs on Small Firms, may help to explain this mutinous insubordination.

We read:

The annual cost of federal regulations in the United States increased to more than $1.75 trillion in 2008. Had every U.S. household paid an equal share of the federal regulatory burden, each would have owed $15,586 in 2008. By comparison, the federal regulatory burden exceeds by 50 percent private spending on health care, which equaled $10,500 per household in 2008. While all citizens and businesses pay some portion of these costs, the distribution of the burden of regulations is quite uneven. The portion of regulatory costs that falls initially on businesses was $8,086 per employee in 2008. Small businesses, defined as firms employing fewer than 20 employees, bear the largest burden of federal regulations. As of 2008, small businesses face an annual regulatory cost of $10,585 per employee, which is 36 percent higher than the regulatory cost facing large firms (defined as firms with 500 or more employees).

When you add to this the unpredictable accretion of new costs and regulatory burdens forthcoming under Obamacare and other pending government initiatives, the reluctance of businesses to make new commitments — especially the small businesses that make up such a large proportion of the US job market, and upon whom the weight of government regulation falls most heavily — is easy to understand.

I had prepared another thousand words on this important topic, but instead, here’s this:

Tip-off

San Francisco is considering a ban on circumcision. In support of this initiative, prepuce protectionists in the City by the Bay have published a comic book that may look eerily familiar to European immigrants of a certain age. It has attracted considerable attention, and rightly so.

Here.

A Note From HLM

Reader JK sends along this gem from H.L. Mencken. I reproduce it in full, with highlights bolded.

H.L.MENCKEN
1524 HOLLINS ST.
BALTIMORE

December 2nd 1927

Dear Charles:-

A few notes:

1. I bought some brown shoes six or eight years ago, and have worn them off and on ever since. I have also taken to brown oxfords.

2. I have now seen about twelve movies, four or five of them to the end. I liked them all pretty well, but am not tempted to go back.

3. My favorite drinks, in order, are: beer in any form, Moselle, Burgundy, Chianti, gin and ginger-beer, and rye whiskey. I use Swedish punch only as a cocktail flavor. I dislike Scotch, and seldom drink it. It makes me vaguely uneasy. I also dislike Rhine wine, save the very best. I never have a head-ache from drink. It fetches me by giving me pains in the legs. When I get stewed I go to sleep, even in the presence of women and clergymen.

4. Curiously enough, I greatly dislike the common American dirty stories, and avoid the men who tell them habitually. They seem dull to me. I love the obscene, but it must have wit in it.

5. As for politics, I always go to national conventions, and have missed very few in 28 years.

6. Of my inventions I am vainest of Bible Belt, booboisie, smuthound and Boobus americanus.

7. I have been in the Johns Hopkins Hospital but once, and then it was for medicine, not for surgery. I think all of the Baltimore hospitals are good, but prefer those run by nuns.

8. I changed my collar to a lower level two years ago.

9. I never use mullen on my hair. Nothing but soap and water ever touches it. George has gone gray greasing his hair.

10. I believe in marriage, and have whooped it up for years. It is the best solution, not only of the sex question, but also of the living question. I mean for the normal man. My own life has been too irregular for it: I have been to much engrossed in other things. But any plausible gal who really made up her mind to it could probably fetch me, even today. If I ever marry, it will be on a sudden impulse, as a man shoots himself. I’ll regret it bitterly for about a month, and then settle down contentedly.

11. I believe in and advocate monogamy. Adultery is hitting below the belt. If I ever married the very fact that the woman was my wife would be sufficient to convince me that she was superior to all other women. My vanity is excessive. Wherever I sit is the head of the table. This fact makes me careless of ordinary politeness. I don’t like to be made much of. Such things please only persons who are doubtful about their position. I was sure of mine, such as it is, at the age of 12.

12. Pilsner should be in Roman type, and begin with a capital.

13. I usually lie to women. They expect it, and it is pleasant to watch them trying to detect it. They seldom succeed. Women have a hard time in this world. Telling them the truth would be too cruel.

14. I am completely devoid of religious feeling. All religions seem ridiculous to me, and in bad taste. I do not believe in the immortality of the soul, nor in the soul. Ecclesiastics seem to me to be simply men who get their livings by false pretenses. Like all rogues, they are occasionally very amusing.

15. I can’t get rid of certain superstitions, and suspect that there must be some logical basis for them. My mother and father both died on the 13th.

16. I am always in trouble around Christmas, and usually about a woman. The fact makes me dread the season.

17. I have another superstition: that all men who try to injure me die. I happens almost invariably. Of the six bitterest enemies I had two years ago, five are dead, all suddenly and unexpectedly.

18. My belief is that happiness is necessarily transient. The natural state of a reflective man is one of depression. The world is a botch. Women can make men perfectly happy, but they seldom know how to do it. They make too much effort: they overlook the powerful effect of simple amiability. Women are also the cause of the worst kind of unhappines

19. I have little belief in human progress. The human race is incurably idiotic. It will never be happy.

20. I believe the United States will blow up within a century. [Sixteen years to go — MP]

21. Being an American seems amusing to me, but not exhilirating. But I am very proud of the fact that I am a native and citizen of the Maryland Free State. I like to believe that I have had a hand in keeping it free.

22. I hope to write at least one good book before I die. Those that I have done are all transient and trivial: they will be forgotten in 25 years. I have ideas for five good books, but shall be content if I manage to write one.

23. I live pretty well, but am careful about money, and greatly dislike extravagant persons. I believe that it is discreditable to be needy. Economic independence is the foundation of the only sort of freedom worth a damn.

24. Most people regard me as very energetic. I am actually very lazy, and never work when I don’t want to. On most days I take a nap. I also take frequent short holidays. But I dislike long ones.

25. I drink exactly as much as I want, and one drink more.

26. I never lecture, not because I am a bad speaker, but simply because I detest the sort of people who go to lectures, and don’t want to meet them. So with the fools who go to public dinners.

27. I have been reported engaged during the past year to six women. It consoles me to reflect that all were charming, and that all save five were beautiful. The total net worth ran to $2500.

28. I dislike receiving presents, and never accept them if I can get out of it. But I like giving them to women and children. Many a worthy gal has lost a handsome beau by giving me something nifty.

29. My apologies for inflicting so long a letter upon you.

Yours,

(Signed, ‘Mencken’)

Required To Be Adults

Here’s some common sense about taxes and the welfare state, from William Voegeli.

Déjà  View

We’re still up in Cape Cod, very busy the past few days with chores and domestic duties as we get ready to head back to Gotham. I’ve got nothing new to offer tonight, so I thought I’d repost an old item (something I don’t think I’ve ever done before): a favorite Wellfleet-themed entry from three years ago.

Here.

More From Sam Harris On Free Will

This entry is part 11 of 15 in the series Free Will

Sam Harris has posted a follow-up to his free-will article, here. He expands on his reasons for believing that our commonsense intuitions about free will are false (no argument from me), but says nothing further about the moral-responsibility issues we discussed in our recent post.

Shoot The Messenger

Because I’ve been away on vacation since the middle of last week, and am somewhat out of touch, I missed some very bad news out of Pakistan: the disappearance of the outstanding Asia Times Pakistani bureau chief, Syed Saleem Shahzad. It is now revealed to be murder, by agents unknown.

NightWatch’s John McCreary comments:

Pakistan: Special comment: On 31 May, the body of Asia Times on Line’s Pakistan bureau chief Syed Saleem Shahzad was found near Gujarat, about 93 miles from Islamabad. He had been missing for several days. He was kidnapped, beaten and tortured, according to the police. Some observers have opined that his exposure of al Qaida or Pakistani Taliban infiltration of the Pakistan armed forces, the Navy in particular, prompted retaliation by Pakistani intelligence. No group has claimed responsibility for the murder.

Shahzad had sources on Afghanistan and Pakistan unlike any other journalists reporting on these countries. His insights were challenging and deserved careful consideration. His explanations always were thought-provoking. His predictions were spot on. He was one of the best analysts reporting on Pakistan.

According to the BBC, “human rights groups recently called Pakistan the most dangerous place in the world for journalists to operate, saying they were under threat from Islamist militants but also Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies.”

We have followed Mr. Shahzad’s reporting for some time now. To readers in the West he was an incomparable resource, and his murder will, as his assassins intended, close one of the few remaining windows into Pakistan’s dark and dangerous interior.

The Buck Stops Nowhere

This entry is part 10 of 15 in the series Free Will

In a new article, Sam Harris argues that common notions of free will are incoherent, and are almost certainly at odds with reality.

The problem is that no account of causality leaves room for free will — thoughts, moods, and desires of every sort simply spring into view — and move us, or fail to move us, for reasons that are, from a subjective point of view, perfectly inscrutable. Why did I use the term “inscrutable” in the previous sentence? I must confess that I do not know. Was I free to do otherwise? What could such a claim possibly mean? Why, after all, didn’t the word “opaque” come to mind? Well, it just didn’t — and now that it vies for a place on the page, I find that I am still partial to my original choice. Am I free with respect to this preference? Am I free to feel that “opaque” is the better word, when I just do not feel that it is the better word? Am I free to change my mind? Of course not. It can only change me.

There is a distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions, of course, but it does nothing to support the common idea of free will (nor does it depend upon it). The former are associated with felt intentions (desires, goals, expectations, etc.) while the latter are not. All of the conventional distinctions we like to make between degrees of intent — from the bizarre neurological complaint of alien hand syndrome to the premeditated actions of a sniper — can be maintained: for they simply describe what else was arising in the mind at the time an action occurred. A voluntary action is accompanied by the felt intention to carry it out, while an involuntary action isn’t. Where our intentions themselves come from, however, and what determines their character in every instant, remains perfectly mysterious in subjective terms. Our sense of free will arises from a failure to appreciate this fact: we do not know what we will intend to do until the intention itself arises. To see this is to realize that you are not the author of your thoughts and actions in the way that people generally suppose.

Good so far. Next, he acknowledges the concern this raises regarding moral responsibility:

The great worry is that any honest discussion of the underlying causes of human behavior seems to erode the notion of moral responsibility. If we view people as neuronal weather patterns, how can we coherently speak about morality? And if we remain committed to seeing people as people, some who can be reasoned with and some who cannot, it seems that we must find some notion of personal responsibility that fits the facts.

Happily, we can.

Really? It’s no easy trick, that.

Well, after reading the rest of Dr. Harris’s essay I have to say don’t think he pulls it off; the argument he puts forward leaves very little room indeed for anything most people would recognize as moral responsibility. As Daniel Dennett said somewhere in one of his books on the subject, “if you make yourself small enough, you can externalize everything” — and Dr. Harris seems to be making the domain of responsible human agency very small indeed. He gives specific examples in which responsibility is mitigated by 1) extreme youth, 2) youth + parental abuse, 3) passion + parental abuse, 4) psychopathy, and 5) brain disease; he also tosses in “bad genes, bad parents, bad ideas, and bad luck”. He does offer a sop at the end; a glimpse of what actual blameworthiness might look like:

If, after weeks of deliberation, library research, and debate with your friends, you still decide to kill the king — well, then killing the king really reflects the sort of person you are.

But given what he has just finished telling us about the inscrutable neural processes that underlie even our preferences, valuations, and volitional acts, it’s hard to see why he would see any of the above as conferring “real” responsibility (as opposed to ascribed responsibility, which is, I think, the best we can do, and is in fact quite good enough).

Now he may be quite right about this: there may be an awful lot less “could have done otherwise” in our actions than we’d like to think, and indeed I’d say it’s neither incoherent nor indefensible to assert that there is actually none at all. But the hard job is to make that compatible with a meaningful and satisfying concept of moral responsibility — and I can’t see that Dr. Harris has managed that here, or even given it much of a try.

Am I missing something? Perhaps I am. Read the whole thing here.

Don’t Let The Door Hit Ya…

Big news for Wolverines fans: Tressel’s out at Ohio State. Story here.

Wild Kingdom

It’s a quiet holiday weekend, and I’ve nothing much to write about. The only major news from here on Hiram Hill is that a fox going by the name of Wily Willy seems to have taken up residence under our deck. He’s an elusive critter, but earlier today I did manage to whip out my phone and snap a shot of him through the living-room window as he trotted by. Here he is:

Junies

We’ve decamped for a few days to the woods near Wellfleet Harbor, and on this warm late-May evening there are some huge insects storming the screens at the doors and windows. June-bugs, I figured they must be, and wanting to know a little more I Googled junebugs Cape Cod.

Here’s what I found. Massachusetts has a special charm that’s all its own.

We Try To Please

Ah, the Shaggs — a pebble in our shoe, a nagging reminder of the dimensionless infinitude of Man (or in this case, three teenage girls).

Our friend Jeffery Hodges cracks open the door for a little peek.

Beta Test

Lawrence Auster, in a post commenting on the idiotic and occasionally dangerous fad known as “planking” (in which people take photos of themselves stretched out horizontally in odd locations), suggests that plankers deserve a Darwin Award.

So far, so good, and I quite agree. But Mr. Auster, who has an intellectually unfortunate antipathy to Darwinism, took the opportunity once again to rail against it (or to rail, I should say, against what he imagines Darwinism to be).

We read:

Collective suicidal behavior meriting the Darwin Award is no joke. Given the immigration and race policies that are being assiduously followed by every historically white country, the entire white race arguably deserves the Darwin Award. Which raises an interesting question. How can Darwinian evolution, consisting of random genetic mutations which are naturally selected because of their power to help their possessors survive and produce offspring, have produced an entire race that is committing suicide? The wholesale adoption of Darwin Award-winning behavior by the white race would seem to suggest that the Darwinian theory of evolution is not true.

Mr. Auster’s post has touched off a long thread at Mangan’s, but as far as I can tell the main point has been missed all round, more or less, so I’ll just make it briefly here.

That point is that we humans embody a disruptive evolutionary innovation. On our little branch of life’s tree (and so far as we know, only on our little branch), evolution has found an unusual corner of design space: one in which behavior is controlled not only by instinct, but also by culture and memetics. We might say that humans are the first general-purpose behavior machines — or to use a computer metaphor, the first in which hard-wired behavior has to any great extent been replaced (and even in our case only partially so, I hasten to add) by the ability to load and run software.

That has given us extraordinary flexibility, and the coupling of cultural/memetic evolution to biological evolution has meant that from a behavioral standpoint, human populations can “speciate” in very short intervals (I use the word “speciate” metaphorically here, of course).

What this means is that even more or less biologically identical human populations can have very different outcomes depending on the “software” they run. The results, however, can be every bit as “Darwinian” as you like; the wages of memetic maladaptation is still extinction. (As an extreme example, consider the Shakers, who incorporated into their behavioral software the rule that they mustn’t have children. There are no longer any Shakers.)

So the answer to the question (leaving aside for now the premise of the particular example):

How can Darwinian evolution, consisting of random genetic mutations which are naturally selected because of their power to help their possessors survive and produce offspring, have produced an entire race that is committing suicide?

…is this: that natural selection’s contribution to the scenario was simply the creation of a flexible machine for running behavioral software. That some software, however, might contain lethal bugs is itself no more an indictment of Darwinism than is the historical fact that the fate of nearly every species that has ever lived has been extinction.

Mr. Auster also wrote this, in response to a commenter who said that his example might be a case of previously adaptive behavior becoming maladaptive in a changed environment:

A new or changed environment can explain a species dying out. But it can’t explain a species systematically adopting an entirely new behavior leading to its destruction, since the new behavior, not enhancing survival and reproduction, would not be naturally selected.

But this gets the temporal sequence exactly backward: first comes variation (the new behavior), and then selection. “Destruction” — i.e. extinction — is how selection does its work. In other words: mutation proposes, selection disposes.

Stuff To Read

For tonight, four foreign-affairs items:

First: A transcript of Mr. Netanyahu’s speech to Congress.

Second: When Vladimir Putin had to step aside in 2008 to honor Russia’s term-limit laws, he selected his chief of staff, Dmitry Medvedev, to keep his seat warm. Now Mr. Putin, eligible to run again in 2012, wants it back — but his former servant, now master, may no longer be inclined to play along. As Paul Gregory argues here, we should hope Mr. Medvedev prevails.

Third: An article from George Friedman at STRATFOR: Obama and the Arab Spring. An excerpt:

Let me repeat something I have said before: All demonstrations are not revolutions. All revolutions are not democratic revolutions. All democratic revolutions do not lead to constitutional democracy.

The Middle East has seen many demonstrations of late, but that does not make them revolutions. The 300,000 or so demonstrators concentrated mainly in Tahrir Square in Cairo represented a tiny fraction of Egyptian society. However committed and democratic those 300,000 were, the masses of Egyptians did not join them along the lines of what happened in Eastern Europe in 1989 and in Iran in 1979. For all the media attention paid to Egypt’s demonstrators, the most interesting thing in Egypt is not who demonstrated, but the vast majority who did not. Instead, a series of demonstrations gave the Egyptian army cover to carry out what was tantamount to a military coup. The president was removed, but his removal would be difficult to call a revolution.

And where revolutions could be said to have occurred, as in Libya, it is not clear they were democratic revolutions. The forces in eastern Libya remain opaque, and it cannot be assumed their desires represent the will of the majority of Libyans ”” or that the eastern rebels intend to create, or are capable of creating, a democratic society. They want to get rid of a tyrant, but that doesn’t mean they won’t just create another tyranny.

Then, there are revolutions that genuinely represent the will of the majority, as in Bahrain. Bahrain’s Shiite majority rose up against the Sunni royal family, clearly seeking a regime that truly represents the majority. But it is not at all clear that they want to create a constitutional democracy, or at least not one the United States would recognize as such. Obama said each country can take its own path, but he also made clear that the path could not diverge from basic principles of human rights ”” in other words, their paths can be different, but they cannot be too different. Assume for the moment that the Bahraini revolution resulted in a democratic Bahrain tightly aligned with Iran and hostile to the United States. Would the United States recognize Bahrain as a satisfactory democratic model?

The central problem from my point of view is that the Arab Spring has consisted of demonstrations of limited influence, in non-democratic revolutions and in revolutions whose supporters would create regimes quite alien from what Washington would see as democratic. There is no single vision to the Arab Spring, and the places where the risings have the most support are the places that will be least democratic, while the places where there is the most democratic focus have the weakest risings.

As important, even if we assume that democratic regimes would emerge, there is no reason to believe they would form a coalition with the United States. In this, Obama seems to side with the neoconservatives, his ideological enemies. Neoconservatives argued that democratic republics have common interests, so not only would they not fight each other, they would band together ”” hence their rhetoric about creating democracies in the Middle East. Obama seems to have bought into this idea that a truly democratic Egypt would be friendly to the United States and its interests. That may be so, but it is hardly self-evident ”” and this assumes democracy is a real option in Egypt, which is questionable.

Obama addressed this by saying we must take risks in the short run to be on the right side of history in the long run. The problem embedded in this strategy is that if the United States miscalculates about the long run of history, it might wind up with short-term risks and no long-term payoff. Even if by some extraordinary evolution the Middle East became a genuine democracy, it is the ultimate arrogance to assume that a Muslim country would choose to be allied with the United States. Maybe it would, but Obama and the neoconservatives can’t know that.

But to me, this is an intellectual abstraction. There is no Arab Spring, just some demonstrations accompanied by slaughter and extraordinarily vacuous observers. While the pressures are rising, the demonstrations and risings have so far largely failed, from Egypt, where Hosni Mubarak was replaced by a junta, to Bahrain, where Saudi Arabia by invitation led a contingent of forces to occupy the country, to Syria, where Bashar al Assad continues to slaughter his enemies just like his father did.

Fourth: Barry Rubin on the Arab Spring, and what to expect in the fall.

A Mighty Wind

I’ve been busy mixing at the moment, and completely out of touch, with no time for following up on matters blogospheric (comment-thread rebuttals, etc.). Back in harness shortly, insh’Allah.

One thing I have seen is the utter devastation in Joplin, MO — and tonight I heard a meteorologist saying something like: “those were little tornadoes, but tomorrow, when the sun boils up all that moisture and a disturbance comes down out of the Rockies, there are likely to be big tornadoes all over the Midwest.”

That’s horrifying. This whole tornado thing is getting really out of hand, I have to say; we even had one here in Brooklyn last year. It’s getting almost, well, Biblical.

Droit de Seigneur

Mark Steyn weighs in on the DSK affair. A morsel:

As the developed world drowns under the weight of Big Government, the gilded princelings of statism will hunker down in their interior courtyards and guard their privileges ever more zealously. Once in a while, as in that Manhattan hotel suite, a chance encounter between the seigneurs and their subjects will go awry, but more often, as in the Geithner confirmation, it will be understood that the Great Men of the Permanent Governing Class cannot be bound by the rules they impose on the rest of you schmucks.

Whole thing here.

Bist Meshugeh?

If you missed it: here’s Prime Minister Netanyahu, explaining reality yesterday after his conversation with the President.

Barry, Bibi, Geography

Given the tone of President Obama’s Middle East speech yesterday, I expect it will be a very lively sit-down with Benjamin Netanyahu today. Awaiting reports.

There was a lot to comment on (e.g. the speech’s thematic Bush-era neoconservatism, the call for “1967” borders, the lack of any mention whatsoever of either Islam or Saudi Arabia, and plenty more) but I’ve no time at the moment. The oddest line by far, though, was this:

The Palestinian people must have the right to govern themselves, and reach their potential, in a sovereign and contiguous state.

What???

You can bet that’s bound to come up in today’s little chat.

*        *        *

Update:

The Syrian people have shown their courage in demanding a transition to democracy. President Assad now has a choice: he can lead that transition, or get out of the way.

…or not

Groupthink

A couple of days ago, David Brooks wrote a column about the evolution of morality by group selection, an idea that is finally gaining broader acceptance. I’m glad to see that happening; the group-selection model provides such a solid foundation for an evolutionary account of the origins of religion and morality that I was persuaded of its validity some time ago, and have been banging the drum (here, for example) ever since. (Mind, it’s still seen as heresy by many in the field; I know Richard Dawkins, for one, is a staunch opponent. But science advances, as they say, funeral by funeral.)

Anyway, it’s understandable that secular types and metrocons like Mr. Brooks would happily embrace the emerging view that group selection is the explanatory basis of human morality; without it, altruism was a nagging loose end for the naturalistic worldview. Mr. Brooks writes:

The story of evolution, we have been told, is the story of the survival of the fittest. The strong eat the weak. The creatures that adapt to the environment pass on their selfish genes. Those that do not become extinct.

In this telling, we humans are like all other animals ”” deeply and thoroughly selfish. We spend our time trying to maximize our outcomes ”” competing for status, wealth and mating opportunities. Behavior that seems altruistic is really self-interest in disguise. Charity and fellowship are the cultural drapery atop the iron logic of nature.

All this is partially true, of course. Yet every day, it seems, a book crosses my desk, emphasizing a different side of the story. These are books about sympathy, empathy, cooperation and collaboration, written by scientists, evolutionary psychologists, neuroscientists and others. It seems there’s been a shift among those who study this ground, yielding a more nuanced, and often gentler picture of our nature.

Yes, very uplifting indeed. But before we all float away on a fragrant cloud of nuanced, cooperative gentleness, I’ll point out that the “iron logic” of Darwinism is still very much the same. The “story of natural selection” now includes the survival of the fittest group, that’s all. The strong still eat the weak, but now we must also keep in mind that the strong groups eat the weak groups, too. The groups that adapt to their environment pass on their genes. Those groups that do not, become extinct.

The same process that selects for “sympathy, empathy, cooperation and collaboration” within groups also selects for high cohesion (tribalism, religious zeal), hostility toward those outside the group (racism, xenophobia), and competing successfully as a group against other groups (war).

Furthermore, as I argued here, the new moral naturalists are trying to pull a bit of a fast one as far as “objective” morality is concerned; at the very least, what they are willing to settle for as an objective basis for defining good and evil will leave many unsatisfied.

But having said all that, I’ll stop carping. It’s gratifying to see the idea of group selection gaining traction.

Read Mr. Brooks’s column here.

Yikes!

Here’s rock-climber Dean Potter, relaxing at Yosemite.

At The Breaking Point

I meant to post this link from STRATFOR a week or so ago, when it first landed in my inbox (but better late than never): a short, sharp summary of the strategic relationship between the US and Pakistan.

Here.

Forever Young

Biologists use the term “neoteny” to describe the retention of juvenile characteristics in an organism’s adult form. Humans exhibit neoteny in many of the morphological features that distinguish us from our primate cousins: our big heads, big brains, small jaws, thin skulls, small teeth, and lack of body hair.

Thinking back the other day on my recent visit to Google, it occurred to me that the place is a hotbed of neoteny. There are toys and playrooms everywhere, and beds for taking naps. On every floor there are little snack-bars decorated in various happy themes. Working hours are unstructured. Everybody eats together, and nobody pays for food. Everybody’s dressed in T-shirts, jeans, and sneakers, and they even push themselves around the building on little scooters.

Once I got to thinking about it, I realized our whole culture has become more and more neotenous. If you look at photos and movies from the mid-twentieth century, it’s striking how grown-up everybody seemed — the men in their suits and hats, the women in their smart dresses. Children knew their place, and adults had serious work to do. Grown-ups smoked, and drank, and ate grown-up food. When they went out at night, they dressed up. They learned penmanship in school, and wrote letters. Popular music was written by people like Cole Porter and Duke Ellington, and the songs had witty, printable lyrics. Tough men vied for beautiful women.

And today? Comic books as literature. “Business casual.” Ill-mannered children in expensive restaurants. Britney Spears. Kanye West. Grown men wearing little safety helmets to ride their bicycles to work. Unfettered impulsiveness as regards almost everything. An infantilizing obsession, in all aspects of public life, with never hurting anyone’s feelings. Unisex everything, just like in kindergarten.

It’s cultural neoteny.

 

 

Snap!

From James Taranto, on l’affaire Strauss-Kahn:

What’s the difference between an orthodox Marxist and a French Socialist? The French guy thinks the state should seize the means of reproduction.

Cheers!

Here you have it, from Stephen Hawking:

“I regard the brain as a computer which will stop working when its components fail. There is no heaven or afterlife for broken down computers; that is a fairy story for people afraid of the dark.”

Charm, Beauty, And Friendly Service

I’ve had no time for writing much of anything today, so for tonight here’s an amusing relic from a bygone age of the world: the 1968 Playboy Club Bunny Manual.