Yesterday’s post was a look at the tension and strife afflicting present-day America. In a comment, reader ‘Magus’ said:
Obligatory libertarian quote: if the Constitution/US political framework set up by founders was unable to prevent the current state of affairs it was either complicit in it or failed to stop it.
Either way, it was faulty.
I’ll respond, for starters, with a less-than-obligatory pedantic nitpick: the conditional ‘if’ was unnecessary. Clearly the Constitution has been unable to prevent the current state of affairs, because here we are.
That aside, though, the question is a good one: why was the Constitution unable to prevent the current state of affairs? Is it reasonable for us to expect the Framers to have come up with a Constitution that could have done the job?
Having never tried my hand at writing a Constitution, let alone a Constitution that must be agreeable enough to all concerned as to be ratified by a diversity of States with widely varying economies and local cultures, I’ll say that the task might be trickier than it seems.
Take, for example, the question of amendments. If a Constitution is to serve for decades or centuries, it will surely be tested by circumstances wholly unforeseeable to its designers. Make it too inflexible, and it will become useless and obsolete, and will simply be ignored, or discarded. But if we make it too easily altered, then it ceases to be a Constitution at all: rather than being the bones of a nation, it is no more than a garment, subject to every passing fashion.
Consider also the question of the judiciary. Unelected and unaccountable, the Supreme Court has has taken unto itself a sovereign and absolute power, beyond the reach of any appeal by the people. Yes, this power is limited by the Court’s inability to rule proactively; it can only exert its authority when a case is brought before it. But it is precisely those questions of the deepest national import that do come before it, and its rulings depend, often, on the whim of a single Justice. Once rendered, those rulings are the absolute law of the land. In this way the Court can usurp, as capriciously as any tyrant, the legislative and executive power — and the people can do nothing about it, short of amending the Constitution, which in a nation riven by factional strife is a practical impossibility. But without a strong judiciary, what is there to prevent the other branches from ignoring the Constitution altogether? Without some means of validating legislative and executive action against the strictures of the “supreme law of the land”, why have a Constitution at all?
You begin to see, I hope, how difficult all of this is. The Constitution that the Framers created was, in my opinion, a work of genius, and it served the nation well for what was, in terms of the histories of republics, an impressively long time, under rapidly evolving conditions. (If you disagree with all of this, I’ll ask you to set aside an hour or two of your time, and write a better one.)
But a constitution is not a nation. It is only a plan for the structure of a nation: a blueprint, an architectural diagram that describes the contours and load-bearing members of an edifice that must ultimately stand up, or fall down, in the real world — and in engineering terms, the reliability of a structure depends upon the materials we build it with. If you are building a nation, those materials are its people, and their culture.
Here we come to the heart of the matter. The plain fact is that building a working system from nothing ”” and nothing, or perhaps just a lot of rubble, is what we would likely be starting with, if we were actually to get the chance to try our own hands at government-building ”” is almost certain to be far more difficult than we, in our armchairs, might imagine. Given the latter-day condition of the American people and culture, the likelihood is that should the gathering storm break upon us, and the cataclysm come to pass, our little plans and designs will be swept away in a far more untidy process than we would prefer, and elementary Power will find its way to the top. Even the startlingly original edifice we call the American Founding was built, not ex nihilo, but on a deep and unshaken foundation of British traditions, and raised by a broadly homogeneous people who, for all their regional variations, had a very great deal in common.
This, then, is what is essential for success, far more so than this or that political form: a basic commonality that can be a foundation for comity and cooperation; a sharing of culture, history, folkways, and heritage that is sufficient for the private life of the home to extend smoothly into the public square without the perceived infringements of social liberty that lead immediately to divisive resentments; and some broad agreement on those things that are to be held sacred, and that form the basis of civic virtue.
With those things in hand, there are all sorts of political systems that can work tolerably well, but without them there are none. It is the great tragedy of our time that we have squandered them all. Might a better Constitution have prevented that? I doubt it very much.